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Public Law 94-103: An Implied Private Right of
Action to Enforce the Right to Treatment for
Institutionalized Mentally Retarded Persons
Authorities on mental retardation recognize that with proper treatment retarded persons, including the severely retarded, are capable of
significant intellectual development.' Owing to society's historic misapprehension of the nature of retardation, however, a large number of mentally retarded persons are still isolated in public institutions where they
receive purely custodial care. Solutions to this inequitys have been
sought in the courts and in Congress, but it has proved difficult to arrive
at an unassailable means of requiring the public institutional programs
to provide treatment that is capable of meeting the developmental needs
of the retarded.
During the past decade, a number of federal courts have determined
that institutionalized mentally retarded persons have a constitutional
right to receive developmental treatment. 4 Although these decisions have
been instrumental in improving the quality of care in public programs,
they have been limited in scope,5 and their validity remains in doubt
'Mason & Menolascino, The Right to Treatment for Mentally Retarded Citizens: An
Evolving Legal and Scientific Interface, 10 CREIGHTONL. REv. 124, 137 n.33 (1976).
'See id,at 130-38. See generally, Herr, Civil Rights, UncivilAsylums and the Retarded,
43 U. CIN. L. REV. 679 (1974). As of 1974, approximately two hundred thousand persons
resided in public institutions for the retarded. Id. at 683. For a graphic, account of the appalling conditions in one of the largest state institutions, see New York State Aso'n for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 755-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
'Given that most nonretarded persons receive public educational and social welfare services that are designed to foster human development, the failure to offer appropriate
developmental services to retarded persons amounts to a denial of equal protection. But
the efficacy of a constitutional equal protection claim depends on whether state laws and
practices that exclude the retarded should be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. This, in
turn, depends on whether the courts will view the retarded as a class that has suffered a
history of purposeful discrimination. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). See generally, Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment" The Qualificationsof HandicappedPersons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal
ProtectionClause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 855, 899-908 (1975).
In the statutory sphere, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1976)) prohibits discrimination against otherwise qualified tandicapped persons in programs receiving federal funds. Section 504, however, seems of little help to institutionalized retarded persons unless it can be established that they are being denied access to programs in which they are qualified to participate. But cf. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1323 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (Section 504 confers
statutory right to habilitation in a nondiscriminatory manner) (alternative holding).
4E.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), affd inpartand vacated andremanded
in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.
1972), affd in part, remanded in part and decision reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally Schoenfeld, A Survey of the ConstitutionalRights of the Mentally Retarded,32 Sw. L.J. 605, 619-26 (1978).
5See infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
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because the Supreme Court has never addressed the right-to-treatment
issue.

6

While the courts were attempting to fashion a constitutional remedy,
Congress responded by enacting a statutory right to treatment: Public
Law; 94-103, The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act of 1975. 7 Title II of the Act 8 purports to confer special treatment rights on all retarded persons in public institutions, 9 but it fails to
indicate how its broad mandates are to be secured, and it is doubtful
whether its purposes can be effected unless it is capable of judicial enforcement. 10 This note compares the rights expressed in Title II with the
rights recognized in the leading constitutional cases, analyzes the statute
in light of the Supreme Court's criteria for implied private rights of action, and argues that Congress intended to permit judicial enforcement of
the statute.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TREATMENT

The landmark right-to-treatment case was the federal district court
decision in Wyatt v. Stickney,II which held that a person confined by a
state on the basis of his mental disabilities has a constitutional right to
receive developmental treatment. 2 It has been argued 13 that the Supreme
Court undermined the Wyatt decision by declining to reach the right-totreatment issue when it was raised in O'Connor v. Donaldson.14 Nevertheless, the Wyatt substantive due process analysis continues to be the
basis for right-to-treatment decisions.' 5

oHalderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1314 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
See also infra note 14.
7
Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1976)).
'Pub. L. No. 94-103, tit. II, 89 Stat. 486 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6010-6012 (1976)).
1H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 42, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 919, 961.
10See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
11344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part and remanded in part and decision
reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (Fifth Circuit affirmed district court's right-to-treatment decision but held that injunctive relief against
the State of Alabama had to be assessed by a three judge court).
12344 F. Supp. at 390.
"See Schoenfeld, A Survey of the ConstitutionalRights of the Mentally Retarded,32 Sw.
L.J. 605, 622-23 (1978).
14422 U.S. 563 (1975). O'Connor upheld a district court decision which mandated the
release of a civilly committed mental patient, but the Court merely held that a state cannot
confine "without more" a nondangerous mental patient. Id. at 576. This decision vacated
the more sweeping Fifth Circuit decision in Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.
1974), which had held that the Constitution requires minimally adequate treatment for persons involuntarily committed to state mental hospitals. Id. at 521. Shortly before the
Supreme Court's decision in O'Connor,the Fifth Circuit had entertained the Wyatt case on
appeal and had relied on its earlier opinion in Donaldson in upholding the district court's
right-to-treatment analysis. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312 (5th Cir. 1974).
"See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1318 (E.D.
Pa. 1977); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1216 (E.D. La. 1976).
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Even if the Wyatt analysis remains good law, it is by no means an ideal
guarantee of effective treatment. Since it relies on compulsory commitment as the basis for imposing the duty to offer developmental treatment, some courts have refused to hold that the constitutional right to
treatment encompasses voluntary residents of state hospitals. 16 In addition, a primary object of the proponents of developmental treatment is to
transfer retarded persons out of institutions and into smaller community
care centers that can offer more treatment and less restraint. 17 However,
the Wyatt analysis tacitly accepts the institutional setting, because it

stresses that the right to treatment flows from the denial of liberty that

accompanies institutionalization.18 Moreover, in apparent deference to
the Supreme Court's admonition against inventing new substantive constitutional rights, 19 the right-to-treatment decisions have mandated only
minimally adequate treatment.2 0 Given the limitations and uncertainties
that are attached to these decisions, there is a clear need for a more
forceful means of securing the rights of institutionalized retarded persons.
THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO TREATMENT

Public Law 94-103 is capable of overcoming many of the difficulties inherent in the constitutional theory because it offers a definitive state-

"E.g., Naughton v. Bevilacqua, 458 F. Supp. 610, 617 (D.R.I. 1978) (court abstained
from the difficult question whether the constitutional right to treatment encompassed a
voluntarily committed resident); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v.
Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 759-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (voluntary status vitiates basis for
constitutional right to treatment). It has been contended that in practice there is little difference between voluntary and involuntary commitment and that there should be equal application of the right to treatment. Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded-Some
Critical
Issues, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 133, 154-55 (1972).
"7Mason & Menolascino, The Right to Treatment for Mentally Retarded Citizens: An
Evolving Legal and Scientific Interface, 10 CREIGHTON L. REv. 124, 143 (1976).
1"344 F. Supp. at 390. Civilcommtment is a "massive curtailment of liberty," Welsch v.
Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 491 (D. Minn. 1974), affd in part and vacated and remanded in
part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977), which invokes the right to treatment, 373 F. Supp. at
499. In the absence of confinement, however, a state is not constitutionally obligated to
provide treatment for the retarded. Id. at 498. But cf Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (habilitation in other than least
restrictive setting is a violation of constitutional rights).
""It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the
name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
2'See Halderman v. Penhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1318 (E.D. Pa.
1977); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 499 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part and vacated
and remanded in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977). The Halderman opinion fails to account for its use of the "minimally adequate treatment" standard, except for a citation to
Welsch. See 446 F. Supp. at 1318. However, the standard was articulated initially in
Welsch, and in that decision the court indicated its reluctance to invent new substantive
rights. 373 F. Supp. at 498-99, citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
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ment of federal statutory rights for persons in public institutions. Title II
of this law requires developmental disability 2' programs receiving federal
funds to provide treatment that is appropriate to the needs of service
recipients.22 It mandates that treatment programs be designed to maximize developmental potential and be provided in a setting that is least
restrictive of personal liberty.22 Thus, where the courts have called for
minimally adequate services, Title II requires maximum development,
and by mandating the least restrictive setting, it rejects the traditional
custodial mode of services. Finally, since it is addressed to the needs of
all institutionalized retarded persons 24 without regard to their commitment status, the statute confers the same treatment rights upon volun2 5
tary and involuntary residents.
In view of these potential advantages, it is unfortunate that Congress
failed to provide for a private right of action to enforce Title II. This
omission need not be fatal, however, because in many instances courts
have been able to discern a basis for judicial enforcement of a federal
statute even though it makes no mention of private remedies. 26 If Title II

is to supersede the constitutional right-to-treatment analysis, it must
meet the prevailing standard for implied statutory rights of action.
STANDARDS FOR IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION

The Supreme Court opinion in Cort v. Ash 7 established four factors for
21

Public Law 94-103 defines "developmental disability" as a disability attributed to mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, autism or dyslexia. 42 U.S.C. § 6001(7)(A) (1976).
2242 U.S.C. § 6010(1) (1976). For the purposes of this note, it will be assumed that the
mandates of Title II apply only to programs that receive federal funds. Such a limitation
seems implicit in 42 U.S.C. § 6010(3)(A) (1976), which obligates federal and state officials to
assure that public funds are not furnished to programs that fail to provide appropriate
treatment. It is questionable whether Congress can require the states to provide
developmental services out of state revenues, because Congress is not supposed to "exercise its power so as to force directly upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be made." National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,855 (1976). On the other hand, it seems settled that
Congress has the authority to impose the right-to-treatment mandate as a condition for
the receipt of federal funds. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974) (Congress may
require equal access to state education programs as a condition for the receipt of federal
funds).
242 U.S.C. § 6010(2) (1976).
2
1H.R. CONF. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 42, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD.
NEWS 919, 961.
2
1Much of the Senate subcommittee research into the failings of state institutions was
directed at the Willowbrook State School in New York. S. REP. NO. 160, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 29-30 (1975). A substantial number of Willowbrook's residents had been admitted
voluntarily. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp.
752,
26 759 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
There is a great deal of literature on judicially recognized private remedies to enforce
federal statutory rights. See generally, McMahon & Rodos, JudicalImplication of Private
Causes of Action: Reappraisaland Retrenchment, 80 DICK. L. REV. 167 (1976); Note, The
Phenomenon of Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes: Judicial Insight,
Legislative Oversight or Legislation by the Judiciary?,43 FORDHAM L. REV. 441 (1974);
Note, Implied Rights of Action to Enforce Civil Rights: The Case for a Sympathetic View.
87 YALE L.J. 1378 (1978).
11422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a federal statute. 2
Three of these criteria are readily satisfied by the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act: the statute is expressly in-

tended to benefit institutionalized retarded persons; 9 a private right of
action to enforce the right to treatment is consistent with the underlying
purpose of the statute;3 and right-to-treatment claims traditionally have
been accommodated in the federal courts.3 1 The only element of the Cort
test that is not resolved by the express language of the statute is whether
Congress intended to create a private judicial remedy.
It might be argued that the Cort test need not be applied in actions
against state-operated institutions because Section 198332 provides a
private right of action to enforce federal statutory and constitutional
rights which have been abridged by persons acting under color of state
law.33 Since most of the residential programs that are subject to the mandates of Title II are state institutions, Section 1983 appears to provide an
independent basis for enforcing the federal statutory right to treatment.
It is doubtful, however, that the effect of Section 1983 is so sweeping

that it can be invoked in favor of a particular substantive federal law
without first questioning whether Congress intended that law to be subject to private judicial enforcement. 34 As the applicability of Section 1983
remains an unresolved issue, the "legislative intent" aspebt of the Cort
test is relevant even in the context of actions against state institutions.
i'Cortwas a stockholder's derivative action seeking damages for violation of the Federal
Election Campaign Act (Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 29, § 610, 62 Stat. 723) (repealed 1976).
In the process of holding that no private right of action was available under the Act, the
Court set forth four criteria for recognizing implied statutory rights of action: whether the
plaintiff is an intended beneficiary of the statute; whether a private right of action' is consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute; whether the claim is one traditionally
relegated to the state courts; and whether there is evidence of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, to create a private right of action. Id-at 78. The Supreme Court continues to rely
on the four Cort criteria. E.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 37-41 (1977).
"See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6010(3), (4) (1976).
'Title II of Public Law 94-103 is entitled "establishment and protection of the rights of
persons with developmental disabilities." Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill
of Rights Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-103, tit. II, 89 Stat. 486.
"Most right-to-treatment cases have been brought in the federal courts. See, e.g., cases
cited supra note 4.

3242 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
"IdThe defendant in Cort was not a state agency, so the role of Section 1983 was not addressed
in the Cort opinion.
34
"There may even be some rights created by federal law that may not be the subject of a
[Section 1983] federal suit." 13 C. WRIGHT. A. MILLER & E. COOPER. FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE 496 (1975). Debate over the scope of Section 1983 has focussed on whether 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3) supplies federal jurisdiction. Naughton v. Bevilacqua, 458 F. Supp. 610,
615 n.2 (D.R.I. 1978). This uncertainty arises because Section 1983 enforces "the Constitution and laws" whereas the jurisdictional statute, Section 1343(3), only speaks to rights
secured by "the Constitution... or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights.
Of course, the federal jurisdictional restrictions do not apply to Section 1983 actions which
are brought in the state courts, but in the state and federal courts alike there remains the
overriding question whether Section 1983 secures all of the "laws" of the United States.
There is a strong basis for contending that if a federal statute contains indications which
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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF TITLE II

The first court to be presented with a private claim under Title II deter35
mined that it satisfied each of the Cort criteria. Naughton v. Bevilacqua
was an action instituted on behalf of a twenty-year-old, voluntarily committed resident of a state hospital for the retarded who had suffered a
severe reaction to a tranquilizer that had been administered to him by a
staff physician. The plaintiff sued the physician, the State Director of
Mental Health and the State of Rhode Island for damages, contending
that they had violated either his constitutional or his federal statutory
right to appropriate treatment.3 6 It was his theory that the tranquilizer
had been administered solely for the purpose of restraint, without regard
to any acceptable habilitative goals.3 7 The court held that the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act creates a
private right of action, and that the plaintiff had stated facts sufficient to
constitute a violation of his statutory right to treatment.3 8
In assessing the intent of Congress, the Naughton opinion found
significance in the "bill of rights" purposes of Title II. The opinion noted
that although the Act had been introduced in the House of Representatives as a conventional federal funding program, it had been amended
by the Senate to include the right-to-treatment provisions, and when it
emerged from the Conference Committee it was identified as a bill of
rights act.3 9 Moreover, even though the statute contains express provi-

sions for administrative enforcement, the court determined that they provided no indication that Congress intended to deny recourse to the
courts.

40

If this assessment of the intent of Congress is valid, then the

legal protections for institutionalized retarded persons are greatly
enhanced, for such a reading suggests that all of the Title II treatment
standards may be enforced in a private lawsuit. A strict appraisal of the
statute will establish that the Naughton determination is appropriate;
weigh against private judicial enforcement, then Section 1983 should not be relied upon as
an alternative basis for a private right of action. See the separate opinion of Justice White
in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2795 (1978).
36458 F. Supp. 610 (D.R.I. 1978). The Naughton opinion indicated that since Title II is
essentially a civil rights statute, Section 1983 is a "particularly appropriate vehicle" for
enforcing Title II. Id at 616. However, the opinion then went on to assess Title II in light

of the Cort criteria.
'Id. at 613.
Id. at 613-15.
36
d. at 615. The court required a showing of deliberate action as a prerequisite to liabil-

ity under Title II, so the plaintiff was allowed to proceed against the staff physician but
the claims were dismissed as to the state director and the state itself. Id at 618-19, citing
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). However, the Supreme
Court has defined "deliberate action" as including acts representing official policy or practice. Id Thus, any established institutional practice failing to comply with the mandates of
Title II would subject the institution to liability under the deliberate-action test.
11458 F. Supp. at 616, citing H. R. CONF. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 42, reprinted
in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEws 919, 961.
40458 F. Supp. at 616.
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however, the statute also contains some contrary indications that merit
preliminary consideration.
The first difficulty is raised by a semantic ambiguity which casts doubt
on whether Congress really intended to create affirmative rights under
Title II. Title II begins with the expression that "Congress makes the
following findings respecting the rights of persons with developmental
disabilities:

....

-41 At first glance, this appears to undermine the suc-

ceeding clauses, which contain the crucial right-to-treatment expressions. Ordinarily, Congress does not "find" rights, it creates them. Thus,
the "findings" clause, taken alone, could be interpreted to mean that
Congress was merely acknowledging the constitutional status quo.
An examination of the statute in its broader context, however, indicates that Congress had something more substantial in mind. The
short title of Public Law 94-103 is the Developmentally Disabled
A~sistance and Bill of Rights Act 42 and Title Iiis subtitled "establishment and protection of the rights of persons with developmental
disabilities." 43 These are clear indications that the legislature intended
to create affirmative rights. The ambiguous language of the findings
clause should be disregarded, and Title II should be viewed as a source of
affirmative rights.
A more formidable question is whether the express enforcement provisions in the Act suggest that Congress did not intend to permit private
judicial enforcement of these rights. The Naughton opinion failed to consider the role of the detailed administrative enforcement provisions in Title I of the Act, and although the court dealt with, and dismissed, the administrative enforcement provisions in Title II, there is a strong basis for
arguing that they were intended to be the exclusive means of enforcing
44
the statutory right to treatment.

In the Cort opinion, the Supreme Court noted that the presence of express enforcement provisions, such as criminal sanctions or administrative remedies, may indicate that Congress did not intend to
create a parallel judicial remedy.4 5 In the aftermath of Cor4 several lower
4142 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976).
"1Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486 (1975) (emphasis added).
4"Pub. L. No. 94-103, tit. II, 89 Stat. 486 (1975).
"For a discussion of the purposes of the administrative remedies in Public Law 94-103,
see United States v. Solomon, 4i9 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976), affd, 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir.
1977). Solomon was an action under Public Law 94-103 instituted by the United States Attorney General to remedy conditions at a state institution for the retarded. The 6ourt
dismissed the suit on the ground that the Attorney General had no authority to sue to enforce the statute. 419 F. Supp. at 372. Emphasizing the alternative remedy afforded by administrative review, the court maintained that in the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act "Congress has provided a scheme whereby the executive
branch of government [Le., HEW] can accomplish much of what the Attorney General
hopes to accomplish in this suit." Id at 369-70.
4"Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79-80 (1975). For a more sweeping exposition of the view that
express enforcement provisions militate against an implied private right of action, see National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
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courts have relied upon this view in denying private rights of action
under statutes providing for some degree of administrative
enforcement. 4 However, a mechanical application of this negative implication view is unjustified. First, the Supreme Court determined that a
private right of action was not necessary to effect the purpose of the
statute at issue in Cort.4 7 Therefore, the negative implication view should
not be controlling if a statute's express remedies are patently
inadequate. 48 In addition, the Cort opinion indicated that express
remedies in one title of a statute enforcing one set of substantive requirements shed no light on congressional intent as to the appropriate
means of enforcing a separate set of requirements in another title of the
statute. 49 This means that any express remedies in Public Law 94-103 enforcing standards that are not identical to the right-to-treatment mandates of Title II should not enter into a determination of how Congress
intended to secure the right to treatment. Finally, the Cortopinion made
it clear that the negative implication view is simply a presumption which
may be rebutted by evidence that the express enforcement provisions
were not intended to operate to the exclusion of other means of enforcement.50 In light of these considerations, the Cort analysis does not
necessarily preclude an implied private right of action under Title II.
THE EXPRESS ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS IN PUBLIC LAW 94-103
An examination and comparison of each of the express enforcement
provisions in Public Law 94-103 will demonstrate that the Cort analysis
does not preclude private judicial enforcement of Title II. There are two
principal titles in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, and they contain separate substantive standards and
separate enforcement provisions. The "bill of rights" aspect is

"[W]hen legislation expressly provides a particular remedy ... courts should not expand
the coverage of the statute [by creating] other remedies." Id. at 458. However, the opinion
also noted that this presumption would "yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent." Id.
"See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1073-74 (7th Cir. 1976), affd
on rehearing, 559 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1977), cert granted, 98 S.Ct. 3142 (1978); Jones v.
Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Ass'n, 453 F. Supp. 150, 153 (W.D. Okla. 1977);
People's Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Poughkeepsie, 425 F. Supp. 482, 489-94 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Note, Implied Rights of Action to Enforce Civil Rights: The Case foraSympathetic
View, 87 YALE L.J. 1378, 1379 (1978).
'7422 U.S. at 84.
""When administrative remedial machinery does not exist to vindicate an affirmative
right, there can be no objection to an independent cause of action in the federal courts."
Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277. 1286 (7th Cir. 1977). Applying the Cort
criteria, the Lloyd decision recognized a private right of action under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976)), even though the statute provided for administrative enforcement. Id. at 1284-86.
"422 U.S. at 79-80, 82 n.14, citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of
R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974), discussed supra note 45.
50422 U.S. at 82.
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manifested in Title II, 51 whereas the "federal assistance" aspect is most
evident in the payment provisions of Title 1.62
The Title I enforcement provision is limited to implementing specific
conditions for Title I payments to state programs.53 This well-defined
funding sanction requires the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare to review and withhold further payments from noncomplying
state programs.54 Although this review power is governed by established

5
hearing procedures,"
the Title I enforcement provision does not con-

template complaints from individuals receiving services in the state programs. States which are denied payments may obtain judicial review of
the HEW determinations,5 6 but there are no provisions enabling other in-

terested parties to obtain such review.6 7 Therefore, the Title I payment
withholding provision could be dismissed simply because it is an inadequate remedy. It is even more vulnerable to attack, however, on the
ground that the Title I program standards do not explicitly address the
right to treatment. They do include several requirements that are fun-

damental components of the right to treatment,55 but they are not so
comprehensive as to be equated with the broader expression in Title II.
The principal enforcement provision in Title II explicitly addressed the
right to treatment,59 but it lacks the elaborate administrative remedies
5
See Pub. L. No. 94-103, tit. II, 89 Stat. 486 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6010-6012
(1976)); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE

CONG. & AD. NEWS 919, 961.

"See Pub. L. No. 94-103, tit. I, 89 Stat. 486 (1975). Title I is an amended version of prior
legislation which furnished federal funds to state programs for the developmentally disabled.
"As a prerequisite to the receipt of Title I payments, states must obtain HEW approval
of their developmental disability programs. 42 U.S.C. § 6063(a) (1976). The conditions for
approval, in pertinent part, require assurances that Title I funds will be earmarked for
developmental disability programs and that these programs will meet certain standards
which address the legal rights and treatment needs of institutionalized persons. See 42
U.S.C. § 6063(b) (1976).
"See 42 U.S.C. § 6065 (1976) (withholding of payments); 42 U.S.C. § 6009 (1976) (evaluation of state programs).
"See 42 U.S.C. § 6065 (1976) (hearings); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1386.80-1386.112 (1977) (hearing
procedures).
5542 U.S.C. § 6068 (1976) (states may appeal to United States Circuit Court of Appeals).
It should be pointed out that the HEW regulations permit other interested parties to request to participate in the funding-sanction hearings. See 45 C.F.R § 1386.94 (1977).
However, it is the language of the statute that is the key to the intent of Congress, and the
statute does not indicate that service recipients are to be represented at these hearings.
"If a statute's administrative enforcement provisions are highly elaborate and designed
to address individual complaints, this may indicate that Congress intended to deny a
private right of action. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976),
afrd on rehearing, 559 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1977), cert granted.98 S.Ct. 3142 (1978). The
Cannon decision denied a private right of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 on the ground that Congress had intended the administrative remedies to be
the sole means of enforcing the rights created by Title IX; but the court stressed that these
hearing procedures were designed to investigate and resolve individual complaints. 559
F.2d at 1073.
"See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 6063(b)(20), (22), (24) (1976) (deinstitutionalization, personal advocacy, human rights).
""The Federal Government and the States both have an obligation to assure that public
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which support the Title I sanction. The Title II funding sanction merely
obligates the federal government and the states to assure that public
funds are not provided to programs that fail to offer appropriate treatment.60 It designates no agency to enforce this obligation and provides no
guidelines as to how the federal government is to review the state programs to determine whether they comply with the Title II standards.
There is no indication that this sanction was intended to address complaints from service recipients, since this would require provisions for investigations and hearings. Moreover, the Title II provision does not expressly impose state recognition of the right to treatment as a condition
for receiving federal payments. The Title II payment withholding sanction is little more than a vague admonition unsupported by any enforcement mechanisms. It is simply too indefinite to constitute the exclusive
means of enforcing the statutory right to treatment."
Title II contains an additional enforcement provision requiring states
receiving Title I payments to establish agencies to protect the rights of
persons with developmental disabilities. 62 These agencies "have the
authority to pursue legal, administrative, and other appropriate remedies
[to enforce] the rights of such persons. '63 It must be stressed that these
agencies are to pursue, rather than to afford, remedies. They have no
remedial authority under the statute, and they are not to be impartial
quasi-judicial bodies. Rather, they are to be actively supportive of
developmentally disabled persons. Their role will be to intervene in other
state agencies and in the courts as advocates of the rights of retarded per6 4

sons.

It is apparent that the express enforcement provisions in the Act were
not intended to be the sole avenues for enforcing the right-to-treatment
expressions in Title II. The administrative remedy in Title I is a complex
enforcement provision, but the conditions it implements do not encompass the right to treatment. The payment withholding provision in Title
II theoretically could be used to enforce the right to treatment, but it is
not supported by any enforcement mechanisms so it is unlikely that Confunds are not provided to any institutional or other residential program for persons with
developmental disabilities that-(A) does not provide treatment, services, and habilitation
" 42 U.S.C. § 6010(3)(A) (1976).
which is appropriate to the needs of such persons ..
6I,L
"Existing HEW supervision is inadequate to enforce the right to treatment. HEW lacks
the resources to review all the public institutions, and the funding sanction is such an unwieldy device that the agency may be reluctant to apply it. See Naughton v. Bevilacqua,
458 F. Supp. 610, 616 (D.R.I. 1978). Whether through a private right of action or through
more roundabout means, the judiciary is the instrumentality best situated to enforce Title
II. See Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Califano, No. 78-1398 (D.D.C., filed July
31, 1978) (suit to compel Secretary of HEW to obey statutory duty to review the funding of
noncomplying state programs), noted in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH. EDUCATION. AND WELFARE.
PUB. No. 79-21017, MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE LAW 9-10 (Oct. 1978).
"42 U.S.C. § 6012(a) (1976).

6"See S. Herr,

ADVOCACY UNDER THE DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ACT

Dep't of HEW, Office of Human Development).

9-10 (1976) (U.S
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gress intended it to be the sole means of securing the right to treatment.
Finally, the local protective and advocacy agencies provided for in Title
II are not empowered to afford administrative remedies of their own.
PRIVATE JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE II:
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

A balanced application of the Cort test demonstrates that the express
enforcement provisions in the Act do not weigh against a private right of
action. However, the Cortopinion did not make it clear whether it is only
necessary to refute the negative implications, or whether it is also
necessary to produce evidence that Congress intended to create a private
right of action.55 If this additional element of proof is required, the
"legislative intent" obstacle might appear insurmountable, for if a
statute fails to provide expressly for a private remedy, the most plausible
explanations are either that the legislators simply failed to consider this
possibility, or that they considered it and rejected it26 It is not surprising, therefore, that in applying this aspect of the Cort test, the courts
7
have found little help in the legislative history of a particular statute.
In the case of Public Law 94-103, however, there is no such difficulty. It
was enacted at a time when the federal courts were the principal guardians of the rights of institutionalized mentally retarded persons.
Accordingly, it would have been difficult for Congress to have ignored
the issue of judicial enforcement. An examination of the language of Title
II, its internal structure, and its legislative history yields a great deal of
evidence that Congress intended to permit judicial enforcement of the
statutory right to treatment.
The language of the statute is the strongest indication of the intent of
Congress. The Cort opinion stated that where a statute clearly bestows
rights upon a class of persons, this obviates the need to establish an intention to create a private right of action. 68 Thus, it is significant that

"See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n
of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974), discussed supra note 45, the Court was not content to rest its decision on the negative implication raised by express enforcement provisions, for the opinion went on to examine the legislative history of the statute at issue
there. Id. at 458-60.
"In National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453
(1974), the Supreme Court determined that Congress had considered and rejected a provision that would have allowed "any aggrieved party" to sue to enforce the law at issue in
that case. Id- at 459-60.
67
See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1074 (7th Cir. 1976), affd on
rehearing, 559 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S.Ct. 3142 (1978) (no evidence
that Congress envisioned individual lawsuits under 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976)); Lloyd v.
Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1285 (7th Cir. 1977) (legislative history of Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976)) is "bereft of much explanation").
"Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975).
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Title II creates a right to treatment in favor of institutionalized mentally
retarded persons.69 The plain and affirmative language in the right-totreatment subsection should be viewed as manifesting an intent to create
judicially enforceable rights.
The Naughton opinion found implicit evidence of this intention in the
internal structure of Title 11. 70 Both the right-to-treatment provision and
the payment withholding provision mandate appropriate treatment, services and habilitation.7 1 If Congress had intended the right to treatment
to be enforced exclusively through a funding sanction, such duplication
would have been unnecessary, for the language of the payment
withholding provision alone is sufficient to convey such a meaning. By
way of comparison, the analogous civil rights statutes express a funding
sanction in the same sentence that creates the substantive right,7 2 and
those that contain more detailed supplementary enforcement provisions
state that such provisions are to enforce the provision which creates the
substantive right.13 In Title II, however, the right-to-treatment expression is separate from, and syntactically independent of, the payment
withholding provision, and it is not incorporated by reference in that provision. As the Naughton opinion noted, this indicates that the denial of
funds was not intended to be the only means of enforcing the right to
treatment.7 4 It is evident that the right-to-treatment provision has a
meaning that is not limited by the payment withholding provision.
Contemporaneous usage of the term "right to treatment" sheds light
on the meaning Congress attached to it. When Title II was being considered by Congress in 1975, the term already denoted a right that could
be enforced in the courts, 75 and it is clear that Congress was cognizant of
the meaning of the term in its judicial context. 76 The legislature's adop6942 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976).
7
Naughton v. Bevilacqua, 458 F. Supp. 610, 616 (D.R.I. 1978).
"Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6010(1) (1976) (right to appropriate treatment, services and
habilitation) with 42 U.S.C. § 6010(3)(A) (1976) (duty to assure provision of appropriate
treatment,
services and habilitation).
7
"See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976): "No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin... be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." See also, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) (sex
discrimination); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) (discrimination on the basis of handicap).
-sSee, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976) (federal departments and agencies directed to enforce
the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000d).
7

,Naughton v. Bevilacqua, 458 F. Supp. 610, 616 (D.R.I. 1978).
E.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312 (5th Cir. 1974); Donaldson v. O'Connor,
493 F.2d 507, 521 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded sub nom. O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563 (1975); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 499 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part
and
vacated and remanded in part,550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
7
6Title II originated in the Senate, and the Senate Report accompanying Public Law
94-103 is replete with references to the contemporaneous court cases. E.g., S. REP. No. 160,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1975), citing Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974);
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in partand
remandedin partand decision reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
76

(5th Cir. 1974). After quoting testimony from the Wyatt transcript describing the condi-
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tion of terminology that is virtually identical to that of the constitutional
right-to-treatment decisions77 indicates that the statutory right to treatment was intended to be subject to private judicial enforcement.
This intention was made explicit in the Conference Committee's interpretation of the meaning of the right-to-treatment provision:
These rights are generally included in the conference
substitute in recognition by the conferees that the
developmentally disabled, particularly those who have the
misfortune to require institutionalization, have a right to
receive appropriate treatment for the conditions for which
they are institutionalized, and that this right should be protected and assured by Congress and the courts.78
All of the reliable evidence indicates that Congress favored judicial enforcement of Title II. The language of the right-to-treatment subsection
is-so affirmative as to be practically inconsistent with a contrary reading.
Since that subsection is independent of the payment withholding provision, there is no reason to conclude that the right to treatment was intended to be enforced solely through the funding sanction. Finally, the
statement in the Conference Committee Report establishes that Congress was aware of the importance of the judicial sanction and intended it
to serve as a principal means of enforcing the mandates of Title II.
CONCLUSION

Title II of Public Law 94-103 creates a private right of action to enforce
the right to treatment for mentally retarded persons in public institutions. The provision which creates this special right is not a paradigm of
clear draftsmanship, but there is ample evidence to support this determination. Although the statute provides for administrative enforcement
and makes no mention of alternative remedies, there is no evidence that
Congress intended to deny recourse to a judicial forum, and there is a
great deal of evidence indicating that Congress assumed, and intended,
tions at a public institution in Alabama, the report states: "Congress must take action to
ensure the humane care, treatment, habiflitation, and protection of mentally retarcted...
persons ....The Federal Government has the responsibility to provide equal protection

under the law to all citizens." S. REP. No. 160, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1975). The use of
the term "euqal protection under the law," which tracks the language of the fourteenth

amendment, suggests that the statutory right was intended to be enforceable in the
courts, just as the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment receives judicial

enforcement.

71Compare42 U.S.C. § 6010(1) (1976) (statutory right to treatment and habifitation) with
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in partand remanded in
part and decision reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderlholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974) (constitutional right to habilitation) and Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 499 (D.
Minn. 1974), aff'd in partand vacated and remanded in part 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977)

(constitutional
right to treatment).
1

H.R. CONF.REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 42, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD.NEWS 919, 961 (emphasis added).
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that Title II would be enforced by the courts. In view of the clear and
compelling purpose of the statute, enforcement through a private right of
action is also justified because the express remedies are incapable of adequately enforcing the right to treatment. The statutory right to treatment offers distinct advantages over the right to treatment generated by
the constitutional theory: the statute applies equally to voluntary and involuntary residents of public institutions and it establishes a more
positive definition of the substance of the right to treatment.
The spirit and purpose of Title II are best reflected in the subsection
which states that treatment for a person with developmental disabilities
should be designed to maximize developmental potential. 9 This expression seems to typify Title II as a whole because it is at once vague and affirmative. It is evident, however, that the statute is susceptible to an affirmative interpretation. Future judicial consideration of Title II should
lead toward a more comprehensive right to developnrental treatment for
institutionalized mentally retarded persons.
JOHN CAHALAN

"See 42 U.S.C. § 6010(2) (1976).

